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Abstract
In this paper we address the question of collusion in mechanisms
under asymmetric information by assuming that one of the colluding
parties oﬀers a side contract to the other one. We develop a method-
ology to analyze collusion as an informed principal problem. We show
that if collusion occurs after the agents accept or reject the principal’s
oﬀer, the dominant-strategy implementation of the optimal contract
without collusion is collusion proof. In the second part of the paper,
we look at a diﬀerent timing, assuming that the agents’ decision to
accept or reject the principal’s oﬀer is taken after collusion, so the
agents share their private information before accepting the principal’s
oﬀer. On the other hand, we assume that the collusion oﬀer includes a
punishment strategy, to be used whenever the other agent rejects the
side contract. We establish the conditions that have to be satisﬁed for
a contract to be collusion proof and we show that the optimal contract
without collusion is no longer collusion proof. The optimal collusion
proof contract is asymmetric, both in transfers and in quantities.
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11 Introduction
In a one-principal-multi-agent environment, the Revelation Principle states
that, in the absence of collusion and in a complete contract framework, the
optimal allocation can be reached by a centralized organization in which
the principal contracts simultaneously with each agent. Any implementable
allocation can be replicated by a mechanism in which agents are asked to
announce their private information and have incentives to tell the truth.
Under the condition that agents tell the truth, the principal extracts as
much rent as possible from the agents. The possibility of collusion, however,
may modify the set of achievable outcomes for the principal, because the
agents may have incentives to coordinate themselves in order to undo the
rent extraction. Knowing this, the principal has to ﬁnd the optimal response
to the possibility of collusion.
Collusion seems quite possible in many classical examples in mechanism
design. In an auction, for instance, the mechanism designer exacerbates
competition between agents in order to obtain a high price for the good.
Bidders may have incentives to coordinate their bids and act as a single agent,
in order to bid as low as possible. In a ﬁrm in which agents work together, it
seems quite easy for the agents to coordinate their actions and take advantage
of the ﬁrm’s oﬀer. Nevertheless, collusion may not be an easy task. In the
ﬁrst place, there is a problem of enforcement. Collusion is in general an
illegal agreement between the agents, so it is diﬃcult to imagine a collusion
agreement being enforced by a court of justice. Therefore, either there is some
reliance on reputation or repeated interaction to justify that the colluding
parties comply with the agreement, or people, for whatever reason, stick to
their promise or word of honor. Second, even if we let aside this question,
the asymmetries of information among the agents may introduce frictions
at the time of signing an agreement. Indeed, if information is symmetric,
any bargaining process will maximize the agents’ joint utility and allocate
the beneﬁts in some particular way, depending on the distribution of the
bargaining power. When information is asymmetric, each agent may want to
conceal his private information in order to increase his own utility, and this
could go against the maximization of joint utility. The relevant question is,
then, what collusion under asymmetric information can achieve.
We consider an organization composed by three parties: a principal, and
two agents. Given a contract oﬀered by the principal, the agents can agree on
a collusion contract. We assume that one of the agents has all the bargain-
ing power at the collusion stage and makes an enforceable take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀer to the other agent (to call this contract we will use the words collusion
contract and side contract interchangeably).
2Laﬀont and Martimort (1997, 2000) develop a methodology to analyze
the case of optimal contracting when agents can sign side contracts under
asymmetric information. They assume that an uninformed third party, inter-
ested in the maximization of joint utility, organizes side contracting between
agents. By doing so, they avoid looking at the problem of bargaining un-
der asymmetric information. The advantage of this methodology is that the
revelation principle applies at the collusion stage.1 On the other hand, this
minimizes the frictions coming from the asymmetry of information, mak-
ing the coalition of agents very powerful against the principal. Using this
methodology, they show that when agents’ private information is statisti-
cally independent the optimal contract without collusion is implementable
even when collusion is possible. This is no longer true when there is correla-
tion between the agents’ private information.
Using the methodology developed by Laﬀont and Martimort, Dequiedt
(2002) examines the question of collusion under asymmetric information with
independent types, but assuming that agents accept the principal’s oﬀer af-
ter having agreed on a collusion contract. Looking at the case of a private
value auction, he shows that if quantity transfers are not feasible at the collu-
sion stage, the principal can beneﬁt by introducing asymmetric mechanisms,
because the presence of asymmetries introduces frictions among the collud-
ing parties. However, when quantity reallocations are feasible, the collusive
power is reinforced and the optimal auction is symmetric.
Another piece of literature related to our paper concerns the mechanism
design by an informed party. This is exactly what we observe at the col-
lusion stage, where a privately informed agent oﬀers a collusion contract to
another agent, also privately informed. Myerson (1983) shows that there is
always an equilibrium of the informed principal game. Moreover, he states
the inscrutability principle, which implies that there is no loss of generality
in restricting attention to pooling mechanisms, that is, equilibria in which
the principal, whatever his type oﬀers the same mechanism to the agent.
Maskin and Tirole (1990, 1992) distinguish two diﬀerent frameworks to ana-
lyze the informed principal problem. In the private value case the principal’s
private information is not an argument of the agent’s utility function. They
show that when this is the case the equilibrium is always Pareto optimal in
the sense that it maximizes a weighted sum of the utilities of the diﬀerent
types of principal. This result is no longer true in the common value case,i n
which the principal’s private information is an argument of the agent’s utility
1Maskin and Tirole (1990) have shown that the revelation principle does not apply in
the informed principal game. Indeed, in order to show their main result, they have to
expand the set of mechanisms, beyond the set of direct revelation mechanisms.
3function. In this case, there may be a unique equilibrium or a continuum of
equilibria, and equilibria are typically ineﬃc i e n tf r o mt h ep o i n to fv i e wo f
the diﬀerent types of principal.
In this paper we address the question of collusion in mechanisms by as-
suming that one of the colluding parties oﬀers a side contract to the other
one. Collusion then has to be analyzed as an informed principal problem.
We assume that the principal is interested in a ﬁnal good, that is produced
using two inputs and each of the agents produces one input. Agents are
privately informed about their marginal cost of production and their private
information is independent. Agents are perfectly symmetric except for the
fact that one of them has all the bargaining power at the collusion stage.
As in Laﬀont and Martimort (1997, 2000), the Revelation Principle has to
be replaced by a Collusion-Proofness Principle, which allows us to restrict
attention to mechanisms that do not leave any scope for collusion. We show
that if collusion occurs after the agents accept or reject the principal’s of-
fer, then the optimal contract without collusion (the second-best contract) is
collusion-proof, as in Laﬀont and Martimort (1998). This shows that in this
particular case, the use of a third party gives a good approximation of what
the principal can obtain when collusion is actually organized by one of the
colluding parties. Moreover, we show that even if we give more power to the
coalition by assuming that one agent can commit to a punishment strategy
if the other agent refuses to collude, the result is not modiﬁed: the optimal
contract without collusion is still collusion-proof. The diﬀerence is that the
implementation is achieved through an asymmetric contract.
In the second part of the paper, we consider a diﬀerent timing, assuming
that the agents’ decision of whether to accept or reject the principal’s oﬀer
is taken after collusion as in Dequiedt (2002). Very often there is some delay
between the principal’s oﬀer and the agents’ agreement, which may be used
to collude against the principal. This makes this analysis particularly rele-
vant. The most obvious example is the case of auctions. The new feature of
this model is that the agents share their private information before accepting
the principal’s oﬀer, meaning that they know each other’s type when the par-
ticipation decision is taken. Furthermore, we assume that the collusion oﬀer
includes a punishment strategy, to be used whenever the other agent rejects
t h ec o l l u s i o nc o n t r a c t .W ee s t a b l i s ht h ec o n d i t i o n st h a th a v et ob es a t i s ﬁed
for a contract to be collusion-proof and we show that collusion becomes eﬀec-
tive. This means that the second-best is no longer implementable, because
it is not collusion-proof. Whenever the principal wants to implement the
second-best contract, the agents ﬁnd a way to undo the principal’s oﬀer and
increase their utility. However, the presence of asymmetries of information
within the coalition implies that collusion is not always eﬃcient. The agents,
4even coordinating their actions, cannot maximize the sum of their utilities.
The principal has to modify her oﬀer with respect to the second-best in or-
der to account for the collusion constraints. Special incentives have to be
provided to the agent who has the bargaining power at the collusion stage.
To do so, the principal oﬀers an asymmetric contract in which the expected
utility of the agent who oﬀers the collusion contract is always higher than
that of the other agent. If we were to analyze collusion using the method-
olgy developed by Laﬀont and Martimort, the result would have been that
the second-best contract is still implementable even when the punishment
is feasible. The reason for such a result is that all the gains from collusion
are obtained through side payments between the colluding parties. However,
when the third party maximizes joint utility, side payments do not matter.
Therefore, we should allow the third party to maximize a weighted sum of
the agents’ utilities in order to make a more ﬂexible analysis. Moreover,
the relative weight given to each agent might be seen as a measure of his
bargaining power.
At a ﬁrst sight, it could seem that contracting with two agents who can
collude is equivalent to contracting with a single agent who produces both
inputs with a total production cost equal to the sum of the costs of the two
agents. However, in our context the principal can do better than in the case
in which she faces such a single agent. The reason is that the agent who oﬀers
the collusion contract (for instance, agent i) is willing to forgo some eﬃciency
in collusion in order to decrease the informational rent that he is obliged to
give up to elicit agent j’s private information. When agent j’s production
cost is high, the coalition does not maximize joint utility, but a “virtual”
joint utility, in which the virtual (aggregate) cost is higher than the total
production cost because it includes the (expected) cost of the informational
rent from i to j.T h ed i ﬀerence between the virtual cost and the production
cost is a measure of the frictions in side contracting created by asymmetric
information. In fact, the principal behaves as if she were facing a single agent
with virtual costs rather than true (production) costs.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the main
features of the model and we derive a weak collusion-proofness principle that
states that the principal can restrict attention to mechanisms for which no
collusion is an equilibrium. In Section 3 we assume that the agents collude
after having accepted the principal’s oﬀer. We provide some conditions for a
mechanism to be weakly collusion-proof and we show that the optimal con-
tract without collusion is weakly collusion-proof. In Section 4 we assume that
collusion occurs before the agents accept or reject the contract and that the
agent who oﬀers the side contract commits to a punishment strategy when-
ever the other agent rejects his oﬀer. We ﬁrst show that the agent who oﬀers
5the side contract always has incentives to set a punishment strategy inde-
pendent of his type. We give conditions for a contract to be collusion-proof
in this context and we show that the optimal contract without collusion is
no longer implementable. We characterize the optimal collusion-proof mech-
anism. We discuss some assumptions of the model in Section 5. Finally, we
conclude in Section 6.
2T h e m o d e l
We consider an organization composed of three agents. A principal (P)
produces a ﬁnal good and contracts with two input suppliers (A1 and A2).
Agent Ak’s contribution to a quantity q of the ﬁnal good is qk.W ea s s u m ea
Leontief production technology: q = q1 = q2.
The principal obtains a monetary revenue from selling the output equal
to S (q) and pays a monetary transfer of tk to Ak. So the principal’s total
proﬁti s






We assume that the function S (·) is increasing and concave and satisﬁes
the Inada conditions: S0 (0) = +∞ and S0 (+∞)=0 .
Agent k receives a monetary payment tk and incurs a linear production
cost θ






Agent k’s marginal cost, θ
k, is his private information. We assume that
marginal costs are independent and identically distributed, drawn from a
common knowledge distribution with support Θ = {θ1,θ2} (θ1 < θ2) ∆θ =






ν1 + ν2 = 1. We assume that at all the optimal solutions the principal’s
proﬁt is positive, so it is never optimal to shut down production, even if both
agents turn out to be high-cost.
We depart from the previous literature in assuming that at the collusion
stage, it is an informed party, A1,w h om a k e st h eo ﬀe r ,s ot h ew a yt oa n a l y z e
this problem is to look at the informed principal literature. For a given oﬀer
by the principal, a collusion contract is a manipulation of reports function,
φ, and side transfers, y,f r o mA 1 to A2.
We need to introduce some deﬁnitions. For a direct revelation mecha-
nism, deﬁne the null collusion contract as the contract in which there is no


















=0for any announcements made at the collusion stage. We
denote by ∅ the null contract.
Deﬁnition 1 A direct revelation mechanism mP is weakly collusion-proof if
there exists one equilibrium of the collusion game in which agent 1’s payoﬀ,
whatever his type, is the same as with the null collusion contract.
Deﬁnition 2 A direct revelation mechanism mP is strongly collusion-proof
if it is weakly collusion-proof and in any equilibrium of the collusion game,
payoﬀs are the same as in the absence of collusive opportunities.
Myerson (1983) has shown that there is always at least one equilibrium
of the informed principal game. So, for any oﬀer mP there is at least one
equilibrium of the collusion game. In order to analyze the outcome of the
collusion game, we invoke Myerson’s inscrutability principle (Myerson, 1983),
which states that, when looking at the informed principal game, there is no
loss of generality in restricting attention to pooling equilibria. This simpliﬁes
things a lot, because it means that on the equilibrium path, the collusive oﬀer
by agent 1 does not modify the beliefs of agent 2.
We are interested in the best contract for P, knowing that collusion is
possible between the two agents. To do that, we prove a weak collusion-
proofness principle.
Proposition 1 Weak collusion-proofness principle. There is no loss of gen-
erality in restricting attention to mechanisms that are weakly collusion-proof
within the class of direct revelation mechanisms.
Proof. We sketch the proof, as it follows the lines of Faure-Grimaud, Laf-
font and Martimort (2002). Suppose P oﬀers a direct revelation mechanism
mP that is not weakly collusion-proof. This means that in any equilibrium
of the collusion game, the collusion contract C is diﬀerent from the null
contract. Choose any of those equilibria, i.e. C∗ that speciﬁes a manipu-
lation of report function φ
∗ and side transfers y∗. Because this contract is
an equilibrium, it satisﬁes A1’s and A2’s incentive compatibility constraints.
Furthermore, because A2 accepts C∗, it gives him more expected utility than
mP.
Suppose instead that the principal oﬀers a new mechanism e mP = mP ◦
C∗. We claim that if this mechanism is oﬀered, there is one equilibrium
of the collusion game in which A1 oﬀers the null contract. Suppose not.
Then, there is another collusion contract, C0 6= ∅, such that for any out-
of-equilibrium beliefs about A1’s type, b ν, and for any corresponding out-of-
equilibrium payoﬀsf o rA 1, b u1,f o rs o m ek ∈ {1,2},t y p ek of agent 1 has more
7utility than under the null contract. But then, C∗ could not have been an
equilibrium in the ﬁrst place, because the contract C00 = C∗ ◦ C0 gives more
utility to type k agent 1 whatever the out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Therefore,
type k agent 1 would have oﬀered C00 rather than C∗, a contradiction.
The idea is that the principal can always eliminate any collusion that
could occur by including in her oﬀer the outcome of the collusion. However,
the collusion-proofness principle is only weak, because there may be multiple
equilibria of the collusion game. There are two sources of multiplicity of equi-
libria. First, Myerson (1983) and Maskin and Tirole (1992) have proved that,
in general, the equilibrium of the informed principal game is not unique. This
is a general property of signaling models, although the problem is less impor-
tant in the informed principal game than in other signaling games, because
in the former it is possible to determine a lower bound for the principal’s
payoﬀ. Second, the conditions for a mechanism to be weakly collusion-proof
depend on the outcome of the game in the (out-of-equilibrium) event in which
agent 2 rejects the side contract, because this is what determines the status
quo at the collusion stage. This outcome, in turn, depends on the out-of-
equilibrium beliefs of agent 1 about agent 2’s type following a rejection. An
usual assumption in the literature on collusion is that beliefs are passive, in
the sense that the beliefs following a rejection of the side contract are equal
to the prior beliefs.2
In contrast with previous collusion-proofness results, we cannot ensure
that actually collusion would not happen given a weakly collusion-proof
mechanism even if we restricted ourselves to passive beliefs. Indeed, due
to the multiplicity of equilibria of the informed principal game our collusion-
proofness principle is only weak for passive beliefs and therefore, at the collu-
sion stage other equilibria diﬀerent from the null contract could be selected.
That a strong version of the principle cannot be proved is straightforward,
because whenever the principal’s oﬀer mP is weakly collusion-proof but fails
to be strongly collusion-proof, the principal may actually obtain the pay-
oﬀ corresponding to mP if the non-collusive equilibrium is selected. The
collusion-proofness principle implies that in order to characterize the princi-
pal’s feasible set we need to ﬁnd necessary and suﬃcient conditions for an
allocation to be weakly collusion-proof.
2See, for instance, Laﬀont and Martimort (1997), (1998), (2000) and Faure-Grimaud,
Laﬀont and Martimort (2001).
83 Ex post collusion
In this section, we follow the approach in Laﬀont and Martimort (1997, 2000),
in the sense that we assume that collusion, if any, occurs after the decision
to accept or reject the principal’s oﬀer.
T h et i m i n gi sa sf o l l o w s :
1.P o ﬀers a mechanism, mP,t oA 1 and A2. mP determines a quantity to
























announcement of his own marginal cost in mP.3
2. A1 and A2 simultaneously accept or reject P’s oﬀer. If one of them
rejects, the game is over and everyone obtains 0. If they both accept,
they go to stage 3.
3. A1 oﬀers a collusion contract, C,t oA 2. C determines a manipulation of















,w h e r eb θ
k
is Ak’s announcement of his
own marginal cost in C.
4. A2 accepts or rejects A1’s oﬀer. If A2 rejects the oﬀer, A1 and A2 go
to stage 6. If A2 accepts A1’s oﬀer, they go to stage 5.
5. A1 and A2 simultaneously announce their types to each other.
6. A1 and A2 simultaneously announce their types to the principal (ac-
cording to the function φ i ft h e yh a da g r e e do nac o l l u s i o nc o n t r a c t ) .
7. Production is carried-out and transfers are paid.
The problem that we have to analyze corresponds to the common value
framework as deﬁned by Maskin and Tirole (1990, 1992), because A2’s status
quo level at the collusion stage is given by the utility he would obtain under
mP, whenever he rejects the side contract, which, in turn, is a function of A1’s
private information. Although there is a problem of multiplicity of equilibria,
3We are here restricting ourselves to mechanisms in which each agent announces only
his own type. However, the principal knows that, if there is collusion, agents will know each
other’s type when playing the grand mechanism. Therefore, a more general mechanism
would be to make both agents announce both types. In this case, the message space of
each agent is Θ×{∅,Θ}, where announcing ∅ means that there was no collusion. Because
the agents can always manipulate information and announce (∅,∅), the principal cannot
gain with such a mechanism (see Laﬀont and Martimort, 1997).
9Maskin and Tirole (1992) have shown that there is a lower bound to the payoﬀ
of the agent who oﬀers the contract that can be easily characterized.
3.1 Some eﬃciency concepts
Collusion-proofness implies some kind of eﬃciency of the null contract at
the collusion stage. Exactly which kind of eﬃciency is something that we
will determine afterwards. For the time being, let us concentrate on some
eﬃciency deﬁnitions, borrowed from Maskin and Tirole (1992) and adapted
to this particular context.






is weakly interim eﬃcient (WIE)
if (a) it is interim incentive compatible for A1 and (b) there is no allocation
satisfying (a) that, regardless of A1’s type, is incentive compatible for A2
and gives A2 at least as much utility. That is, a WIE allocation is, for some


































2 (φi`)+yi` − θ`q(φi`) ≥ t













































4Because we allow a stochastic manipulation of reports, the function ti (φk`) (resp.
q(φk`)) has to be interpreted as an expectation with respect to the distribution of reports
in the grand contract induced by φk`. Similarly, S (q(φk`)) is the expectation of the
function S.































2 (φi`)+yi` − θ`q(φi`) ≥ t




















As Maskin and Tirole (1992) have shown, any RSW allocation is WIE
and, therefore, incentive compatible for agent 1. Moreover, any WIE alloca-
tion is RSW relative to itself. This result will turn out to be important for
the characterization of weakly collusion-proof mechanisms.






is interim eﬃcient relative to be-
liefs b ν (IE(b ν)) if and only if for some vector of positive weights, {wk}k=1,2 it








































































An important result is that, regardless of his type, agent 1 can always
guarantee himself the payoﬀ corresponding to the RSW allocation. Indeed,
11he can propose the allocation that solves problem IIk.N o t i c e , t h e n , t h a t
whatever the beliefs of agent 2 about agent 1’s type, A2 accepts the contract
and is truthful, and therefore, A1’s payoﬀ is the RSW payoﬀ. This implies
that in order to look for the set of equilibria of the collusion game, only
allocations that give at least the RSW payoﬀ to both types of A1 can be
candidates. We will call b u1
k the RSW payoﬀ of type k agent 1.
In order to look for the set of weakly collusion-proof mechanisms, we can
restrict attention to (interim) incentive compatible direct revelation mecha-
nisms, because, on the equilibrium path, collusion does not occur.
Proposition 2 Assume that the RSW allocation is IE relative to some strictly
positive beliefs and that the null contract satisﬁes agent 2’s incentive con-
straints whatever the type of agent 1. Then, a) if the null contract is RSW
relative to the status quo allocation, the mechanism mP is weakly collusion-
proof; b) the converse is also true provided that agent 1 is truthful even if
agent 2 rejects the side contract.
Proof. a) If the RSW allocation is IE relative to strictly positive beliefs,
the RSW allocation is an equilibrium of the game (Theorem 1*i nM a s k i n -
Tirole, 1992). But the RSW allocation is the null contract itself. Therefore,
the null contract is an equilibrium of the game and mP is weakly collusion-
proof.
b) Since A1 can guarantee the RSW payoﬀ, we know that in any equilib-
rium of the collusion game, any type k A1 gets e u1
k ≥ b u1
k.N o w ,b e c a u s eA 1
is truthful on mP when A2 rejects the side contract, the status quo payoﬀ
of A2 is the null contract (by assumption, A2 is truthful whatever his beliefs
about A1’s type). Suppose that the null contract is not RSW relative to
itself. Then, it is not weakly interim eﬃcient. Now, since the null contract
satisﬁes the ex post incentive compatibility constraints of A2,i ts a t i s ﬁes all
the constraints in program I (it satisﬁes A1’s incentive compatibility con-
straints because mP is interim incentive compatible), but it is not RSW, so
∀k, b u1
k ≥ u10
k ,w h e r eu10
k is the utility of type k A1 under the null contract.
Moreover, ∃k such that b u1
k >u 10
k because the null contract is not WIE. Thus,
the null contract cannot be an equilibrium of the collusion game, because
it gives strictly less utility than the RSW allocation to at least one type.
Therefore, mP is not weakly collusion-proof.
Proposition 2 gives, then, necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the grand
contract to be weakly collusion-proof, provided that the RSW allocation is
interim eﬃcient for some strictly positive beliefs. Loosely, a mechanism is
weakly collusion-proof if and only if the null contract corresponding to this
mechanism is an RSW allocation in the collusion game. Maskin and Tirole
12(1992) describe the set of equilibria of the informed principal game with
common values as the set of allocations that are interim incentive compatible
for both agents, give more than the outside opportunity to agent 2 and
Pareto dominate the RSW allocation from A1’s perspective. This implies
that the RSW allocation itself is an equilibrium of the game. Therefore, if
the null contract is RSW, it is an equilibrium of the collusion game and the
grand contract is weakly collusion-proof. To show the converse is a bit more
tricky, because of two reasons. First, there may exist a weakly collusion-proof
contract that satisﬁes the interim incentive constraints for agent 2, but not
the ex post incentive constraints. By deﬁnition, this contract cannot be an
RSW allocation. Second, it may be the case that, when agent 2 rejects the
side contract, the original oﬀer, mP, is not incentive compatible for agent 1
given his new (out-of-equilibrium) beliefs about agent 2’s type. This changes
agent 2’s outside option, which depends on the announcement made by agent
1 to the principal. It could be, then, that the null contract cannot compensate
this new outside option, so it cannot be an RSW allocation. There are two
obvious cases in which agent 1 is truthful out of the equilibrium path. One
is the already mentioned case of passive beliefs. Because the original oﬀer
is incentive compatible for the prior beliefs, whenever the out-of-equilibrium
beliefs are equal to the priors, agent 1’s incentive compatibility constraints
are satisﬁed also out of the equilibrium path. The second case, is the case in
which agent 1’s incentive compatibility constraints are satisﬁed whatever the
type of agent 2. This case is particularly interesting, because the fact that
agent 1 is truthful out of the equilibrium path is independent of the speciﬁc
out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
3.2 The second-best contract
If collusion between agents is impossible (for instance, non-enforceable),
the best the principal can do is to oﬀer the second-best contract, msb = ¡
t1sb,t 2sb,qsb¢























































































































































































































Since the agents are both risk neutral, the principal has some degrees of
freedom in choosing the transfers, because only the expected transfer given to
14each agent is determined by the optimal contract (the principal has 4 linear
equations to determine 8 transfers). The quantities, however, are uniquely
determined in the second-best contract.
One interesting property of the second-best contract is that it can be im-
plemented in dominant strategies (see Laﬀont and Tirole, 1993, chap. 7 and
Mookherjee and Reichelstein, 1992). That is, we can ﬁnd transfers such that


































We are now ready to state the main result of this section.
Proposition 3 The dominant-strategy implementation of the second-best con-
tract is weakly collusion-proof.
Proof. By deﬁnition, the dominant strategy implementation satisﬁes
Ai’s incentive constraints type by type, therefore, it is weakly collusion-proof
if and only if at the collusion stage, the null contract is the RSW allocation
and it is interim eﬃcient for some strictly positive beliefs (this last point is
proved in Proposition 5). By deﬁnition, the null contract is RSW relative to






`ν`(t1 (φk`) − yk` − θkq(φk`))
subject to
t2 (φ11)+y11 − θ1q (φ11) ≥ t2 (φ12)+y12 − θ1q (φ12)( λ11)
t2 (φ12)+y12 − θ2q (φ12) ≥ t2 (φ11)+y11 − θ2q (φ11)( λ12)
t2 (φ21)+y21 − θ1q (φ21) ≥ t2 (φ22)+y22 − θ1q (φ22)( λ21)
t2 (φ22)+y22 − θ2q (φ22) ≥ t2 (φ21)+y21 − θ2q (φ21)( λ22)
t2 (φ11)+y11 − θ1q (φ11) ≥ ∆θqsb
12 (µ11)
t2 (φ12)+y12 − θ2q (φ12) ≥ ∆θqsb
22 (µ12)
t2 (φ21)+y21 − θ1q (φ21) ≥ 0( µ21)
t2 (φ22)+y22 − θ2q (φ22) ≥ 0( µ22) P
` ν` (t1 (φ1`) − y1` − θ1q(φ1`)) ≥
P
`ν`(t1 (φ2`) − y2` − θ1q(φ2`)) (γ1) P
` ν` (t1 (φ2`) − y2` − θ2q(φ2`)) ≥
P
`ν`(t1 (φ1`) − y1` − θ2q(φ1`)) (γ2).
At the null contract, we have φk` =( θk,θ`) ∀k,`, yk` =0∀k,∀` and
λ12 = λ22 = γ2 =0 , because the incentive constraints for a high-cost agent
15i are slack. Moreover, all the constraints of the problem above are satisﬁed,
so we just need to show that it maximizes the objective function. Taking
derivatives with respect to yk`, we obtain that an RSW allocation satisﬁes
the ﬁrst order conditions:
µ11 = ν1 (1 + γ1) − λ11 ≥ 0,
µ21 = ν1 (1 − γ1) − λ21 ≥ 0,
µ12 = ν2 (1 + γ1)+λ11 ≥ 0,
µ22 = ν2 (1 − γ1)+λ21 ≥ 0. (2)
Optimizing with respect to φij and using (2), we obtain that the null



























































































or, ∀(k,`) ∈ {1,2}






















































































Using (1), we have that the dominant-strategy implementation of the
second-best satisﬁes all the collusion constraints for λ11 = λ21 = γ1 =0 .
16Therefore, the null contract is RSW relative to itself and the second-best
contract is weakly collusion-proof, according to Proposition 2.
According to Proposition 3, collusion does not have any eﬀect on the
principal’s oﬀer. The principal can still implement the second-best contract
in dominant strategies even if agents can collude, by appropriately choosing
the values of the multipliers. Notice that this implementation of the second-
best contract is symmetric, even though agents are actually asymmetric,
because at the collusion stage all the bargaining power belongs to agent 1.
This is also the result found in Laﬀont and Martimort (1997) when they allow
for non-anonimous contracts. The diﬀerence with their paper is not in the
result, but in the methodology. We provide here some insights on how one
should look at the problem of collusion under asymmetric information, when
it is organized by one of the colluding parties. This is a ﬁrst step for the
analysis of collusion as a bargaining process under asymmetric information.
The dominant-strategy implementation of the second-best contract is
weakly collusion-proof, so there is one equilibrium in which collusion does
not occur. However, given the multiplicity of equilibria of the collusion game,
this does not mean that collusion will not actually happen. Indeed, it may
be the case that at the collusion stage there be other equilibria, and any
equilibrium could be selected. Therefore, an interesting question is whether
the null contract could be the unique equilibrium at the collusion stage. We
can easily eliminate one source of multiplicity of equilibria.
Remark 1 The dominant-strategy implementation of the second-best con-
tract is weakly collusion-proof whatever the out-of-equilibrium beliefs follow-
ing a rejection of agent 2.
The idea is that because the contract is implemented in dominant strate-
gies, the incentive constraints of agent 1 when there is no collusion are sat-
isﬁed for any beliefs about agent 2’s type. Therefore, suppose agent 2 rejects
the side contract. Then, no matter what agent 1 infers from this action, he
has always incentives to tell the truth. Thus, agent 1 announces θi if he is
actually type i, what happens with probability νi. So, from type j agent 2’s



















which are satisﬁed, because the contract is incentive compatible in dominant
strategies also for agent 2.
17Proposition 4 For given out-of-equilibrium beliefs following a rejection, if
the null contract is an RSW allocation relative to the status quo and is in-
terim eﬃcient relative to the prior beliefs, then the null contract is the unique
equilibrium of the collusion game.
Proof. Because the RSW allocation is interim eﬃcient relative to the
prior beliefs (which are strictly positive), then the set of equilibrium alloca-
tions is the set of allocations that satisfy the interim incentive compatibility
constraints of the two agents and the interim participation constraints of
agent 2 and Pareto dominate (from agent 1’s view point) the RSW alloca-
tion. Even if the RSW allocation is not unique, the RSW payoﬀsf o rA 1 are.
Now, because the null contract is an RSW allocation and is interim eﬃcient
relative to the prior beliefs, in any equilibrium of the collusion stage, A1’s
payoﬀ is the RSW payoﬀ. Therefore, A1 cannot do strictly better by oﬀering
a non-null collusion contract and, thus, no collusion occurs.
When the RSW allocation is interim eﬃcient relative to the prior beliefs,
the set of equilibria of the informed principal game shrinks to the RSW al-
location. By deﬁnition of interim eﬃciency, no other incentive compatible
allocation dominates the RSW allocation. Therefore, once agent 1’s beliefs
about agent 2’s type following a rejection of the side contract are ﬁxed (there-
fore, agent 2’s status quo payoﬀ is also ﬁxed), if the null contract is RSW
and interim eﬃcient relative to the prior beliefs, it has to be the unique
equilibrium.
Given Proposition 4, the second-best contract is strongly collusion-proof
if it is weakly collusion proof and the null contract is interim eﬃcient relative
to the prior beliefs. By deﬁnition, the null contract is interim eﬃcient relative






` wkν`(t1 (φk`) − yk` − θkq(φk`))
subject to
P
k b νk (t2 (φk1)+yk1 − θ1q(φk1)) ≥
P





k b νk (t2 (φk2)+yk2 − θ2q(φk2)) ≥
P





k b νk (t2 (φk1)+yk1 − θ1q(φk1)) ≥
P
k b νk∆θqsb
k2 (b µ1) P
k b νk (t2 (φk2)+yk2 − θ2q(φk2)) ≥ 0( b µ2) P
` ν` (t1 (φ1`) − y1` − θ1q(φ1`)) ≥
P
` ν` (t1 (φ2`) − y2` − θ1q(φ2`)) (b γ1) P
` ν` (t1 (φ2`) − y2` − θ2q(φ2`)) ≥
P
` ν` (t1 (φ1`) − y1` − θ2q(φ1`)) (b γ2).
Keeping the assumption that agent 1 is truthful also out of the equilibrium
path (which is true for the dominant-strategy implementation), we know that
18the null contract is RSW relative to itself, so, it satisﬁes all the constraints
for any vector b ν.M o r e o v e r ,b λ2 = b γ2 =0 . So we only need to check that it
maximizes the objective function for the prior beliefs.
Proposition 5 If the second-best contract is oﬀered and the null contract is
RSW relative to itself, then, the null contract is interim eﬃcient relative to
the prior beliefs.
Proof. Suppose without loss of generality that w1 + w2 = 1.F r o mt h e
ﬁrst order conditions with respect to yk`, the null contract is interim eﬃcient
relative to beliefs b ν if
b γ1 = b ν1 − w1 ≥ 0,
b µ2 = 1 − b µ1 ≥ 0,
b λ1 = ν1 − b µ1 ≥ 0. (4)
So, it is interim eﬃcient relative to the prior beliefs if the conditions are
satisﬁed for b νi = νi.
Optimizing with respect to φij and using (4), the following conditions



























































































By assumption, the null contract is RSW relative to itself, so conditions
(3) are satisﬁed. Moreover, (3) imply (5) whenever
b µ1 =











The last condition can be satisﬁed, because there are enough degrees of
freedom in choosing the values of the multipliers in the RSW problem. In
19particular, it is satisﬁed for the dominant-strategy implementation, for which
λ11 = λ21 =0 .
Proposition 5 implies that, whenever the null contract is RSW relative
to itself, the principal can choose values for the multipliers to make the
null contract the unique equilibrium at the collusion stage with ﬁxed out-of-
equilibrium beliefs following a rejection by agent 2. By doing so, the principal
eliminates other equilibria at the collusion stage and thus, can ensure the
second-best payoﬀ. The next step is to analyze whether this is an optimal
choice.
Proposition 6 If the dominant-strategy implementation of the second-best
contract is oﬀered and the null contract is RSW relative to itself, the principal
always strictly gains by making the null contract interim eﬃcient relative to
the prior beliefs.
Proof. Suppose the second-best contract is weakly collusion-proof but is
not strongly collusion-proof. That is, there is an equilibrium of the collusion





. In this equilibrium at least one type of A1 is strictly
















According to Theorem I * in Maskin and Tirole (1992), any equilibrium





















































































that is, the collusion contract is incentive compatible for the two agents, gives
at least the same utility as the original (second-best) contract to agent 2 and
gives more than the RSW payoﬀ to agent 1. And because the second-best
contract is weakly collusion-proof, the null contract is the RSW allocation
and agent 1’s RSW payoﬀ is the second-best payoﬀ.

































k` ≡ t2 ¡
φk`
¢
and suppose the princi-








,s ot h en u l l
contract following this oﬀer is an equilibrium of the collusion stage.
Given conditions (6), contract m0 satisﬁes all the constraints of problem

































S (q) is a concave function so, ∀k, ∀`,5






























Therefore, the principal is better oﬀ when there is no collusion. Moreover,
the probability of collusion can be made equal to zero by choosing multipliers
to make the null contract interim eﬃcient relative to the prior beliefs.
The second-best contract maximizes the principal’s payoﬀ when there
is no collusion. Collusion in this context can never be beneﬁcial for the
principal, because it would mean that lying is better than telling the truth
for the principal, which contradicts the Revelation Principle. Therefore, if
the collusion game has multiple equilibria, including the null contract, the
principal’s payoﬀ when the null contract is selected is at least as high as in
any other equilibrium. However, by choosing the values of the multipliers, the
principal can guarantee that the unique equilibrium of the collusion game,
when the dominant-strategy implementation of the second-best contract is
oﬀered, is the null contract. In this way, she is sure to obtain the second-best
payoﬀ, even when collusion is possible.
The result of this section implies that the coalition is not powerful enough












21We could imagine that collusion would be more powerful if agent 1 could
commit to punish agent 2 whenever the latter rejects the side contract. For
instance, he could commit to announce a high-cost if the side contract is not
accepted (assuming that he can indeed commit to such an announcement).
This reduces agent 2’s outside option because agent 2’s rent decreases when
agent 1 is ineﬃcient and gives more power to agent 1 to implement collusion.
Indeed, the dominant-strategy implementation of the second-best is not RSW
relative to the new status quo of agent 2. A coalition of (θ1,θ2) would like to
pretend to be (θ2,θ2). With this manipulation of reports agent 1 can impose
a small penalty to agent 2 whenever the state is (θ1,θ1). When agent 1 could
not commit to punish agent 2, this kind of deviation was impossible because
at y p e1 agent 2 would have rejected the penalty and would have chosen to
play non-cooperatively the grand mechanism. If the punishment is credible,
type 1 agent 2 accepts the penalty, because his utility is lower when agent
1 punishes by announcing a high-cost. Technically, what happens is that
the multipliers of the participation constraints of a low-cost agent 2 in the
RSW program, µ11 and µ21, are now equal to 0. However, there is another
implementation of the second-best contract that is RSW when µ21 = µ11 =0 .
Of course, in order to avoid a manipulation of reports as mentioned before,
the collusion constraint of a (θ1,θ2) coalition who pretends to be (θ2,θ2) has
to be binding. Computing the multipliers for µ21 = µ11 =0and choosing









































































We need condition γ1 < ν1 in order to prevent a coalition of (θ2,θ1) from
pretending to be (θ2,θ2) and to guarantee that the null contract is interim
eﬃcient relative to the prior beliefs (see Proposition 5). Thus, the same
conclusions are drawn with a model in which collusion is more powerful in the
sense that agent 1 can punish agent 2 following a rejection. Risk neutrality on
the agents gives the principal enough degrees of freedom to ﬁnd (asymmetric)
transfers such that the second-best contract is weakly collusion-proof. The
22whole trick consists in rewarding (punishing) an ineﬃcient agent 1 when he
meets an eﬃcient (ineﬃcient) agent 2 and give a constant rent to an eﬃcient
agent 1 (independent of both agents’ types). The second-best contract is still
implemented in dominant strategies for agent 2. Because all the bargaining
power at the collusion stage belongs to agent 1, there is no point in changing
the implementation for agent 2. It is enough to oﬀer a contract such that
agent 1 cannot improve by oﬀering a collusion contract. Nevertheless, notice
that agent 1 gets a negative utility when the state of nature is (θ2,θ2) in
order to discourage him from proposing such a manipulation of reports.
4 Ex ante collusion
We have shown in the previous section that collusion is not an issue if types
are independent. This result depends, however, on a strong assumption about
communication. It is assumed that the agents accept the principal’s oﬀer be-
fore collusion takes place. Implicitly, this means that, before collusion, there
is communication between the principal and the agents, but this communi-
cation is limited. Indeed, if the principal can communicate with the agents
before the agents communicate with each other, what prevents her from forc-
ing the agents to send messages about their types at the same time? This
would prevent any possible collusion. A more plausible assumption is that
collusion between the agents happens before accepting or rejecting the prin-
cipal’s oﬀer. This is typically the case in an auction, in which participation
takes place with some delay after the design, giving time to the potential
participants to communicate with each other before deciding whether to par-
ticipate or not. Following Dequiedt (2002), we assume in this section that
agents collude before accepting or rejecting the principal’s oﬀer. The eﬀect
of such an assumption is that the participation constraints have to be satis-
ﬁed type by type, because the type of agent i is revealed to agent j at the
collusion stage. Therefore, when the agents accept the principal’s oﬀer, they
know each other’s type. We know from the results of the previous section
that the principal can still implement the second-best contract with type by
type participation constraints. She just needs to oﬀer the dominant-strategy
implementation. Thus, in order to make the problem interesting, we also
assume that the agent who oﬀers the collusion contract can punish the other
agent whenever the latter rejects the side contract.
Punishing agent 2 may be an ex post suboptimal strategy for agent 1.
However, agent 1 can ﬁnd some means to commit to play an ex post sub-
optimal strategy. Consider, for instance, the following mechanism oﬀered by
agent 1. Following the principal’s oﬀer, agent 1 oﬀers a contract to agent
232 and to an uninformed witness. This contract consists of the side contract
between agent 1 and agent 2 and speciﬁes the punishment strategy if agent 2
rejects the oﬀer and a small payment ε to the witness if he accepts the oﬀer.
Moreover, agent 1’s oﬀer includes a bank deposit equal to π,w h i c hg o e sb a c k
to agent 1 if agent 2 accepts the oﬀer. The contract speciﬁes that whenever
agent 2 rejects the oﬀer, if agent 1 follows the punishment strategy, he can
get the deposit back. If agent 1 deviates from the punishment strategy, the
witness can enforce the contract and get π for himself. If agent 1 deviates
from the punishment strategy and the witness does not enforce the contract,
the money goes to charity. The penalty π can always be made large enough
in order to force agent 1 to implement the punishment strategy whatever his
type. The witness always accepts the oﬀe rb e c a u s eh ei ss u r et og e tε, and,
therefore the punishment strategy becomes enforceable even though it is not
ap r i o r iex post optimal. Moreover, with this mechanism there is no scope
for renegotiation between agent 1 and the witness.
The new timing is as follows:
1.P o ﬀers a mechanism, mP,t oA 1 and A2. mP determines a quantity to
























announcement of his own marginal cost in mP.
2. A1 oﬀers a collusion contract, C,t oA 2. C determines a manipulation















,w h e r eb θ
k
is Ak’s announcement of his
own marginal cost in C and a punishment function (x(θ1))i fA 2 rejects
A1’s oﬀer. The punishment strategy is the announcement of A1 in mP
if A2 rejects the collusion contract.
3. A2 accepts or rejects A1’s oﬀer. If A2 rejects the oﬀer, A1 and A2 go
to stage 5. If A2 accepts A1’s oﬀer, they go to stage 4.
4. A1 and A2 simultaneously announce their types to each other.
5. A1 and A2 simultaneously accept or reject P’s oﬀer. If one of them
rejects, the game is over and everyone obtains 0. If they both accept,
they go to stage 6.
6. A1 and A2 simultaneously announce their types to the principal (ac-
cording to the function φ if they agreed on a collusion contract or
according to the function x for A1 if they did not).
247. Production is carried-out and transfers are paid.
First, notice that the second-best contract without collusion is not af-
fected by this change in the timing, because if there is no collusion, the
agents have to accept or reject the principal’s oﬀer under asymmetric infor-
mation, so participation constraints are still interim.6 Second, the status
quo utility at the collusion stage, given by the payoﬀ of A2 if he rejects the
collusion oﬀer, is determined by the punishment strategy of A1.M o r e o v e r ,i f
the punishment strategy is independent of A1’s type, the common value com-
ponent of the collusion game disappears and the problem can be analyzed
under the private value framework. We will show that it is indeed optimal
for agent 1 to commit to set his punishment strategy independent of his type.
Proposition 7 It is optimal for Agent 1 to commit himself to set a punish-
ment strategy independent of his type.
Proof. See Appendix.
By committing to a type independent punishment strategy, agent 1 trans-
forms the collusion game in an informed principal problem with private val-
ues. A property of the private value case is that the equilibrium is unique. On
the contrary, if the punishment strategy depends on agent 1’s type, the game
remains a common value problem, characterized, in general, by a multiplicity
of equilibria. Among all equilibria, each type of agent 1 ﬁnds one particu-
lar equilibrium that gives him the highest payoﬀ. The idea is that agent 1,
whatever his type, can reproduce his best possible equilibrium in a common
value context with a type independent punishment strategy. Moreover, he
avoids the problem of multiplicity of equilibria inherent to the common value
framework, eliminating all equilibria that give him a lower payoﬀ.H ec a nd o
at least as well with a type independent punishment strategy as in the best
possible equilibrium with type dependent punishment strategy. Therefore,
he does strictly better than in any other equilibrium.
4.1 Type independent punishment strategy
Suppose that agent 1 sets a punishment strategy independent of his private
information:
x(θ1)=x(θ2)=x ∈ {θ1,θ2}.
6Even if participation constraints were ex post, the second best contract without col-
lusion would be the same, because, as we showed before, the second-best contract can be
implemented in dominant strategies.




















that is, agent 2 chooses the best strategy in the gran contract, given the pun-
ishment strategy of agent 1. Agent 2 has always the possibility of rejecting
the grand contract and, then, can always guarantee himself a 0 payoﬀ.B e -
cause the punishment strategy is independent of agent 1’s type, the problem
has to be analyzed in the private value context. Using the results in Maskin
and Tirole (1990) and Quesada (2002) we can characterize the solution of
the collusion game.
Proposition 8 a) If the punishment strategy is x = θ2 then a grand contract
is collusion-proof if and only if it satisﬁes the following conditions:
t
2





21 − θ1q21 = t
2



























ij − θiqij ≥ 0 ∀i,∀j, (8)

















































b) Given any collusion-proof contract, agent 1 weakly prefers to set his
punishment strategy at x = θ2.
We ﬁrst prove the following lemma on monotonicity of the quantity pro-
ﬁle, and we prove then Proposition 8.
Lemma 1 If the punishment strategy is type-independent, any collusion-
proof mechanism satisﬁes the monotonicity condition q11 ≥ q21 ≥ q12 ≥ q22.






is collusion-proof if the null contract
is a solution of the collusion game. Given that the collusion game ﬁts the
private value framework, and because agents are risk neutral, we can analyze
this game as if agent 2 knew agent 1’s marginal cost.



















t2 (φi1) − θ1q(φi1)+yi1 ≥ t2 (φi2) − θ1q(φi2)+yi2 (λi1)
t2 (φi2) − θ2q(φi2)+yi2 ≥ t2 (φi1) − θ2q(φi1)+yi1 (λi2)
t2 (φi1) − θ1q(φi1)+yi1 ≥ max{0,u 2
0 (θ1 /x)} (µi1)
t2 (φi2) − θ2q(φi2)+yi2 ≥ max{0,u 2
0 (θ2 /x)} (µi2)
If the null contract is a solution to this problem, then the grand contract
satisﬁes the following conditions:
t
2
11 − θ1q11 ≥ t
2
12 − θ1q12, (10)
t
2
12 − θ2q12 ≥ t
2
11 − θ2q11, (11)
t
2
21 − θ1q21 ≥ t
2
22 − θ1q22, (12)
t
2
22 − θ2q22 ≥ t
2
21 − θ2q21, (13)
t
2


































and the incentive compatibility constraints of agent 1 (with private values,
the incentive constraints of the party who oﬀers the contract are never bind-
ing). Then, from (10) and (11), and from (12) and (13) we obtain
q11 ≥ q12,
q21 ≥ q22. (18)








2 (x,θ2) − θ2q (x,θ2) ≥ 0. (20)
27Optimizing with respect to yij we obtain the ﬁrst order conditions:
λ11 − λ12 + µ11 = ν1,
λ12 − λ11 + µ12 = ν2,
λ21 − λ22 + µ21 = ν1,
λ22 − λ21 + µ22 = ν2.





































































































Case 1: the punishment strategy is x = θ2.
Suppose that at the collusion stage the participation constraint of the
high-cost agent 2 and the incentive constraints of the low-cost agent 2 are
binding (we will verify ex post that the other constraints are satisﬁed too).
Then, transfers are given by
t
2















22 = θ2q22 + u
2
0 (θ2 /θ2),
and multipliers are λ12 = λ22 = µ11 = µ21 =0 , λ11 = λ21 = ν1, µ12 = µ22 = 1.
Replacing in (21), we have that telling the truth is an optimal strategy























































































28Moreover, these conditions imply the monotonicity constraints
q11 ≥ q21 ≥ q12 ≥ q22.




0 (θ1 /θ2) − u
2
0 (θ2 /θ2) ≤ ∆θq12,
u
2
0 (θ1 /θ2) − u
2
0 (θ2 /θ2) ≤ ∆θq22,
q11 ≥ q12,
q21 ≥ q22.
The last two constraints come immediately from (18). According to (19)


















0 (θ1 /θ2) − u
2
0 (θ2 /θ2)=∆θq22 ≤ ∆θq12.
Case 2: the punishment strategy is x = θ1.
In this case, the previous solution does not satisfy the participation con-
straint of a low-cost agent 2 when agent 1 is high-cost if q12 >q 22.S ot h i s
constraint has to be binding at the collusion stage: µ21 > 0.S u p p o s e t h a t
the multipliers are λ12 = λ22 = µ11 =0 , λ11 = ν1, µ12 = 1, µ21 = ν1 − λ21,
µ22 = ν2 + λ21 and ν1 ≥ λ21 ≥ max{0,ν1 − ν2} and λ21 > 0 ⇒ q12 = q22.
This implies also that (q12 − q22)(ν2 − ν1) ≥ 0. We will check that indeed
the other constraints are satisﬁed at the optimal solution.
Replacing in the objective function, we have that the optimal manipula-























































































29Moreover, given that λ21 ≥ ν1 − ν2, these conditions imply the mono-
tonicity constraints
q11 ≥ q21 ≥ q12 ≥ q22,




0 (θ1 /θ1) − u
2
0 (θ2 /θ1) ≤ ∆θq12,
u
2
0 (θ1 /θ1) − u
2
0 (θ2 /θ1) ≥ ∆θq22,
q11 ≥ q12,
q21 ≥ q22.
The last two constraints come immediately from (18). According to (19)


















0 (θ1 /θ2) − u
2
0 (θ2 /θ2)=∆θq12 ≥ ∆θq22.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8 . a) The proof follows immediately from the
p r o o fo fL e m m a1,c a s e1 and from the fact that the participation constraints
of agent 1 have to be satisﬁed.
b) Following the proof of Lemma 1, if the punishment strategy is x = θ1,
a collusion-proof grand contract has to satisfy:
t
2





21 − θ1q21 = u
2










22 − θ2q22 = u
2
0 (θ2 /θ1). (22)
Given that the contract has to satisfy the type by type incentive and par-







30Take any collusion-proof contract with some u2
22 = t2
22 − θ2q22.U s i n g
(7) and (22) we can determine all the other transfers to agent 2, for a given
punishment strategy:
x = θ2 x = θ1
t2
11 = θ1q11 + ∆θq12 + u2
22 t2
11 = θ1q11 + ∆θq12 + u2
22
t2
21 = θ1q21 + ∆θq22 + u2
22 t2
21 = θ1q21 + ∆θq12 + u2
22
t2
12 = θ2q12 + u2
22 t2
12 = θ2q12 + u2
22


















The outside option of agent 2 at the collusion stage is weakly smaller
when x = θ2.A g e n t 1’s payoﬀ is decreasing in agent 2’s outside option,
therefore, agent 1 weakly prefers x = θ2.
We have found necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a grand contract to
be collusion-proof, provided that agent 1’s punishment strategy is indepen-
dent of his own type. From an ex ante point of view (before knowing agent
2’s type), the optimal punishment strategy is to announce θ2 whenever agent
2 rejects the side contract. The intuition is that by announcing θ1 agent 1
increases the outside option of agent 2, given that any contract oﬀered by the
principal has to satisfy the ex post incentive constraints for agent 2 in order
to be collusion-proof. Increasing agent 2’s outside option can only decrease
agent 1’s payoﬀ. Therefore, agent 1 can obtain more from the collusion if he
threatens agent 2 with a harsh announcement in case of rejection. Similarly,
it is weakly preferred to set x = θ2 to any randomization between θ1 and θ2.
There is another possible punishment that we did not consider here. Agent
1 could punish agent 2 by rejecting the principal’s oﬀer. However, we can
easily see that agent 1 cannot do better with such a punishment. Threat-
e n i n ga g e n t2w i t har e j e c t i o no ft h eg r a n dm e c h a n i s mc e r t a i n l yd e c r e a s e s
the outside option of a low-cost agent 2, who gets a strictly positive utility if
the contract is signed in any collusion-proof contract. Nevertheless, the par-
ticipation constraints of a low-cost agent 2 are non-binding in the optimal
collusion contract and, thus, the decrease in the low-cost agent 2’s outside
option does not increase agent 1’s payoﬀ. Therefore, the only beneﬁtw o u l d
come from a decrease of the outside option of a high-cost agent 2. But the
principal wants to minimize agent 2’s utility and, thus, any optimal collusion-
proof contract will have the ineﬃcient agent 2’s utility equal to 0 and agent
1 cannot decrease it further.
31Collusion is eﬃcient (i.e., maximizes the sum of the agents’ utilities)
whenever agent 2 is eﬃcient. As usual, there is no gain from introducing in-
eﬃciencies in side contracting when agent 2 is eﬃcient. However, a distortion
in side contracting appears whenever agent 2 is ineﬃcient. This distortion
helps reducing the informational rent that agent 1 h a st og i v eu pi no r d e rt o
obtain truthful revelation from a low-cost agent 2. When agent 2’s produc-
tion cost is high, the coalition does not maximize joint utility, but a “virtual”
joint utility, in which the virtual (aggregate) cost is higher than the total pro-
duction cost because it includes the (expected) cost of the informational rent
from 1 to 2. The diﬀerence between the virtual cost and the production cost
is a measure of the frictions in side contracting created by asymmetric infor-
mation. The private value feature of the model and the assumption of risk
neutrality imply that the distortion is the same that would arise in a model
in which agent 1’s private information were known by agent 2. At this point,
it is important to bring attention to the problem of multiple equilibria at the
side contracting stage. It is shown in Quesada (2002) that when both parties
are risk neutral, the informed principal problem has an inﬁnity of equilibria.
Nevertheless, agent 1’s (the principal in the side contract) payoﬀ,w h a t e v e r
his type, is the same in all equilibria. This property allows us to neglect the
problem of equilibrium selection without loss of generality. Indeed, suppose
that, given a grand contract mP, there is one equilibrium in which agent 1
strictly gains by oﬀering a non-null collusion contract. Then, the null con-
tract is never an equilibrium collusion contract, because agent 1 would also
gain by oﬀering any other side contract that would be an equilibrium of the
collusion game following mP. Similarly, if the null contract is one equilibrium
of the collusion game given mP, no other equilibrium can do strictly better
than the null contract and, therefore, mP is strongly collusion-proof.
Another interesting point is that the incentive constraints for agent 1
are always satisﬁed, even though they have been neglected in the analysis.
This is also due to the private value framework. When agent 1 is eﬃcient
his incentive constraint is just satisﬁed, while the incentive constraint of an
ineﬃcient agent 1 is slack.
With all these ingredients we are ready to show that collusion is now
powerful enough to improve with respect to the second-best contract.
Proposition 9 The second-best contract is not collusion-proof.
Proof. First, notice that for the second-best contract to be accepted at




























































































Finally, the second-best contract satisﬁes with equality the interim incen-


































So, actually, the second-best contract has to be implemented in domi-
nant strategies. Now, agent 1 has incentives to oﬀer a collusion contract in
w h i c hi ns t a t e(θ1,θ2) the coalition announces (θ2,θ2), and punish agent 2
by announcing θ2 if he rejects. Indeed, he does not need to compensate a
high-cost agent 2 for this change of announcement because the latter will
33get 0 anyway. On the contrary, he can impose a penalty to agent 2 in state







When agents collude before accepting the principal’s oﬀer, agent 1 can
always ﬁnd a collusion contract diﬀerent from the null contract that makes
him better oﬀ if the principal oﬀers the second-best contract. Therefore,
the second-best contract is not collusion-proof and the principal has to of-
fer another grand contract among the set of collusion-proof contracts. The
diﬀerence with the case in which agents accept or reject the grand contract
before colluding is that the principal loses some degrees of freedom that have
to be used to satisfy the ex post participation constraints instead of the col-
lusion constraints. Moreover, knowing that collusion proofness requires that
agent 2’s incentive constraints be satisﬁed type by type, another degree of
freedom is lost in this operation. The second-best quantity and the aggre-
gate marginal cost are the same in states (θ1,θ2) and (θ2,θ1), then, to prevent
collusion the principal has to give the same total transfer in both states of
nature. Thus, the last degree of freedom is exhausted. Therefore, if there
is a way to implement the second-best contract it has to be in dominant
strategies. But then, agent 1 has incentives to collectively announce (θ2,θ2)
when the true state is (θ1,θ2).B yd o i n gs o ,a ne ﬃcient agent 1 decreases the
rent he has to give to an eﬃcient agent 2 to obtain truthful revelation. In-
deed, suppose both agents are eﬃcient: the true state of the world is (θ1,θ1).
Agent 1 wants agent 2 to reveal his true type at the collusion stage, so he
has to guarantee a utility at least equal to what agent 2 would get by lying,
which depends on the announcement of a coalition (θ1,θ2):
t
2 (φ12)+y12 − θ1q (φ12). (23)


















Therefore, agent 1 can reduce the utility of agent 2 in state (θ1,θ1) by im-






, the stakes for collusion. Thus,
al o w - c o s ta g e n t1 is strictly better oﬀ by oﬀering this collusion contract.
It is the interaction of both the ex post participation constraints and the
punishment strategy what makes the second-best contract non-implementable
when collusion is possible. Indeed, we have proven in the previous section
that only one of those conditions is not enough to prevent the principal from
34implementing the second-best contract. On the one hand, if agent 1 does
not have access to a punishment technology, the principal can satisfy ex post
participation constraints by increasing the status quo utility level of agent 2
in order to make any collusion oﬀer very expensive for agent 1. On the other
hand, if a punishment technology is available but participation occurs in an
interim stage, the principal can still implement the second-best contract by
oﬀering a contract that gives a negative utility to agent 1 whenever both
agents are ineﬃcient, destroying the stake of collusion. However, when agent
1 has access to a punishment technology and participation is ex post, the
principal cannot manage anymore to implement the second-best contract.
Agent 1 can always take advantage of the second-best contract with a side
contract in which a coalition of (θ1,θ2) announces (θ2,θ2).B yd o i n gs o ,h e
relaxes the incentive constraint of a low-cost agent 2, because qsb
22 <q sb
12, and,
therefore, can reduce the transfer (ask for a fee) to a low-cost agent 2. Fi-
nally, agent 2 is willing to accept to pay such a fee because agent 1 threatens
to punish him by announcing a high cost in the grand mechanism.
The second-best contract, then, cannot be an optimal contract for the
principal because it cannot be implemented when collusion is possible. In
Proposition 8 we have obtained the characteristics of the set of collusion-proof
(implementable) contracts. We now look at the best oﬀer of the principal.
Proposition 10 The best collusion-proof contract is characterized by the fol-







































































































































The contract is asymmetric in transfers and quantities (qc
21 >q c
12)a n d






















Proof. Any collusion-proof contract satisﬁes conditions (7) and (9). So,



















We do not need to include agent 1’s incentive compatibility constraints,
because they are implied by (7) and (9). The monotonicity conditions q11 ≥
36q21 ≥ q12 ≥ q22 have to be satisﬁed and the binding constraints are
t
2










12 − θ2q12 ≥ 0,
t
2
22 − θ2q22 ≥ 0,
t
1


































Indeed, if the monotonicity condition is satisﬁed, all the other constraints
are satisﬁed at the optimal contract.
Solving the system gives the corresponding transfers. Replacing in the
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S (q11) − 2θ1q11 − ∆θ(q21 + q22) − ∆θν1




S (q12) − (θ1 + θ2)q12 − ∆θq22 − ∆θν1




S (q21) − (θ1 + θ2)q21 − ∆θq22 − ∆θν1
ν2 (q12 − q22)
i
+ν2
2 [S (q22) − 2θ2q22]

     
     
,
(26)
and maximizing with respect to qij gives conditions (24). This is indeed




12.H o w e v e r ,qc
12 ≥ qc















2 < ν1, the monotonicity constraint is binding: qc
12 = qc
22 and


























































The optimal collusion-proof contract entails no rent for a high-cost agent
2 and the minimum informational rent for a low-cost agent 2. Therefore,
nothing is changed for agent 2 with respect to the second-best contract in
terms of transfer functions (of course, the eﬀective transfers are diﬀerent
because the quantities are distorted). So, the whole loss coming from the
possibility of collusion is transferred to agent 1, in order to prevent him from
oﬀering a collusion contract that could undo the principal’s oﬀer. Indeed,
agent 1 receives a rent even when he is ineﬃcient. The rent is equal to 0
when both agents are ineﬃcient, but is strictly positive whenever agent 1
is ineﬃcient and agent 2 is eﬃcient if qc
12 >q c
22. The reason is that the
principal has to guarantee a non-negative rent in all states of nature and, at
the same time, avoid collective misreport. The principal wants to discourage
a coalition of (θ1,θ2) from pretending to be (θ2,θ2) (that was the problem
with the second-best contract) by increasing agent 1’s rent in state (θ1,θ2).
This implies, then, that a rent has to be given to agent 1 to prevent a coalition
of (θ2,θ1) from pretending to be (θ1,θ2), which is now more attractive.
This additional rent is proportional to (q12 − q22), so the principal has
incentives to decrease production in state (θ1,θ2) and increase it in state
(θ2,θ2), compared to the second-best quantities. In any case, however, pro-
duction is downward distorted compared to the ﬁrst-best levels. The distor-
tions with respect to the second-best increase in ν1.F o rν1 large enough the
monotonicity condition q12 ≥ q22 becomes binding and the optimal collusion-
proof mechanism entails bunching. When ν1 is large, it becomes too costly
for the principal to deter collusion with a separating contract. The prin-
cipal would like to oﬀer a contract with q12 <q 22, but this goes against
collusion-proofness. Therefore, she destroys the stake of collusion by choos-
ing q12 = q22.
One interesting result of Proposition 10 is that the principal oﬀers an
asymmetric contract, both in transfers and in quantities. The asymmetry
in transfers comes from the fact that agents actually are asymmetric with
respect to the bargaining power at the collusion stage, so the principal has
to give special incentives to agent 1 in order to prevent collusion. The fact
that collusion happens before the agents decide whether to accept or reject
the grand contract introduces one additional asymmetry, now in quantities,
aiming at reducing informational rents in an eﬃcient way. Distorting q21 is
useful to reduce the rent in state (θ1,θ1), while distorting q12 helps reducing
rents in all states of nature. So the principal is willing to reduce more pro-
d u c t i o ni ns t a t e(θ1,θ2) than in state (θ2,θ1), even though the total marginal
cost is the same in both cases. Indeed, the virtual marginal cost in state
(θ1,θ2) is θ1 + θ2 + ν1
ν2∆θ, larger than in state (θ2,θ1). The virtual marginal
38cost includes the cost of the informational rent that has to be given by agent
1 to agent 2 in order to obtain truthful revelation at the collusion stage.
5 Discussion
We considered a very simple model of collusion under asymmetric informa-
tion. However, many results may be extended to more general cases. Accord-
ing to the informed principal literature, the results concerning the collusion
game are also valid when agents have n types. The methodology of analysis
can, therefore, be used to look at cases with more than 2 types.
All along this paper, we have looked at a very particular production
function that implies strong complementarities between the two agents. In
particular, the optimal punishment strategy is highly associated to this prop-
erty. Indeed, the harshest punishment we can think of when goods are perfect
complements is the rejection of the grand contract, because the production
of one agent is completely useless without the production of the other. Of
c o u r s e ,t h i si sn o tt h ec a s ea n y m o r ew h e ng o o d sa r es u b s t i t u t e s . T a k e ,f o r
instance the other extreme of perfect substitutes. Then, the rejection of the
grand contract more than a punishment becomes a reward, because in this
case the agent is sure that he will be chosen to produce. On the contrary, the
harshest punishment is to announce a low cost in order to exclude the other
agent from the market. The same is true in an auction, in which the agents
c o m p e t ef o rt h eg o o dt h a ti sb e i n go ﬀered. Nevertheless, the methodology
developed here can also be used to analyze these cases, with the correspond-
ing adjustment in the optimal punishment strategy.
One point that deserves some words concerns the enforcement of collusion.
In order to be able to apply the tools available in contract theory, we have
to assume that there is a third party able to enforce collusion. However,
collusion is meant to be a secret (and often illegal) agreement between the
parties, so it is diﬃcult to think that a court of justice will play this role.
A more complete analysis would incorporate collusion as part of a repeated
game in which enforcement comes either from reputation eﬀects or from the
threat of punishment in posterior stages of the game. In the same lines
of discussion, we have assumed that there is an uninformed third party (the
witness) who is used as a commitment device to enforce an ex post suboptimal
punishment strategy. Although this third party is quite innocuous, in the
sense that is called by the colluding parties, and is uninformed about all
relevant variables (it could be randomly chosen from the telephone directory),
the participation of a third party goes against the secrecy that involves a
collusion agreement. We can imagine colleagues playing the role of third
39parties as a signal of their willingness to participate of such collusive contracts
in the future.
The last important issue is the allocation of the bargaining power at the
collusion stage. We considered here the simplest possible case in which one
party has all the bargaining power at the collusion stage and the identity of
this party is common knowledge. Thus, the principal oﬀers a collusion-proof
contract, knowing that it is only agent 1 who can oﬀer a take-it-or-leave-
it side contract. Another possibility, certainly more realistic, is that the
allocation of the bargaining power is private information of the colluding
parties. This case, of course, is much more diﬃcult to deal with because, on
top of collusion, the principal faces a problem of multidimensional screening.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we analyzed the problem of collusion under asymmetric in-
formation in mechanisms with multi-agents. The main contribution with
respect to the existing literature is that we explicitly model collusion as an
oﬀer from one informed party to the other one. This introduces more realism
in the analysis of coalition formation, at the cost of adding technical com-
plexities in solving the collusion problem. However, we believe that these
technical diﬃculties are worth to be looked at, in order to understand the
real constraints that the principal has to consider when collusion is an issue.
The results in this kind of models are usually very sensitive to the tim-
ing of the game. For this reason, we look here at two alternative timings.
First, we assume that agents decide whether to accept or reject the princi-
pal’s oﬀer before collusion occurs. If there is no collusion, the agents play
non-cooperatively the grand mechanism. In this context, the relevant frame-
work to analyze the collusion problem is to look at an informed principal
with common values, because the status quo utility is determined by the ex-
pected utility in the grand contract, which depends, in turn, on the private
information of all the agents. The problem with this model is that there is in
general a plethora of equilibria, and therefore, questions of equilibrium selec-
tion become relevant. We show, however, that the optimal contract without
collusion is implementable even when agents can collude. Moreover, even
if the agent who oﬀers the side contract could commit to punish the other
agent if the latter refuses to collude, the principal is still able to implement
the second-best contract. However, the implementation of the second-best
contract in this case is essentially asymmetric, because the agents themselves
are asymmetric, and therefore, special incentives have to be provided to the
agent who has the bargaining power at the collusion stage.
40In the second part of the paper, we suppose that agents accept or reject
the principal’s oﬀer after colluding. Then, the principal loses some degrees
of freedom because she has to satisfy the ex post participation constraints of
the agents. This, in turn, gives more power to the collusion to undo the prin-
cipal’s oﬀer. Moreover, we assume that agent 1 commits to punish agent 2 in
the grand mechanism if agent 2 rejects the side contract. Then, if the pun-
ishment strategy is independent of agent 1’s private information, collusion
has to be analyzed using the private value framework, which has, in general,
a unique equilibrium and this equilibrium is Pareto optimal. We show that
it is ex ante optimal for agent 1 to commit to a type independent punish-
ment strategy. In this context, we show that the second-best contract is no
longer implementable when collusion is possible. The principal has too few
degrees of freedom to satisfy all the collusion constraints together with the
ex post participation constraints. Therefore, collusion becomes costly, and
the principal will distort production with respect to the second-best contract
in order to trade-oﬀ eﬃciency and rents. She introduces more asymmetries,
because the optimal collusion-proof contract is asymmetric both in transfers
and in production, and the cost of collusion is transferred to the agent who
has the bargaining power at the collusion stage.
In terms of comparisons with the previous literature and, in particular
with the third party methodology, our analysis shows that, if agents have
diﬀerences in their bargaining power, a third party who maximizes joint
utility is unable to reproduce the equilibrium of a more realistic collusion
game. Indeed, with ex ante collusion and feasible punishment the principal
cannot implement the second-best contract when agent 1 has all the bar-
gaining power, while she could have done it if collusion were organized by
an uninformed third party maximizing joint utility. Therefore, in order to
obtain a better approximation the third pary must be allowed to maximize
a weighted sum of the agents’ utilities in which the weights will the depend
on the diﬀerences in bargaining power.
A Appendix







If the punishment strategy is type independent, the relevant framework to
analyze collusion is private values. Then, the equilibrium is always Pareto
optimal (Maskin and Tirole, 1990 and Quesada, 2002). Suppose that the
punishment strategy is to announce θ1 with probability x and θ2 with proba-
bility 1−x. Then, the equilibrium collusion contract solves, for some vector






























































































Moreover, the incentive constraints of agent 1 are not binding at the
optimum (γ1 = γ2 =0 ). Taking derivatives with respect to yij, we obtain:
w1 = λ1 − λ2 + µ1,
ν2w1 = −ν1λ1 + ν1λ2 + ν1µ2,
ν1w2 = ν2λ1 − ν2λ2 + ν2µ1,
w2 = −λ1 + λ2 + µ2,
w h i c hi nt u r ni m p l i e s
w1 = ν1 (µ1 + µ2),
w2 = ν2 (µ1 + µ2).
Suppose now that the punishment strategy is to announce θ1 with prob-
ability xi and θ2 with probability 1−xi if agent 1 is of type i. If the punish-
ment strategy is type dependent, the problem has to be analyzed under the
common value context. In general, there are many equilibria, but the best















































































































and b u1 (θk) the RSW payoﬀ of type k agent 1.




































































2 − 2 ≥ 0.




































































2 − 2 ≥ 0.
Therefore, the best possible equilibrium for type i agent 1 can be obtained








































































with (w1,w 2)=( 1,µ 1
1 + µ1
2 − 2) if it is type 1 and (w1,w 2)=( µ2
1 + µ2
2 − 2,1)
if it is type 2.
43Problems PV and CV i are equivalent if e u2 (θj)=u2 (θj), which happens

















Moreover, (29) and (30) together with (27) and (28) imply that γi
i > 0 ∀i,
meaning that at least one incentive constraint of agent 1 is binding in problem
CV i.S op r o b l e mPV is less constrained than problem CV i. Therefore Agent
1, whatever his type, does strictly better with a type independent punishment
strategy, by setting x = ν1x1 + ν2x2.
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